上海市行政法制研究所译审外事室  （总第32期）

     [译文规范]

    一、关于“保证金”用词的规范

    经济类法规、规章或规范性文件中常常会出现保证金一词，对该词的翻译方式目前出现的主要有 “deposit”，“practice qualifications”，“margin”等等。在法律用语中，deposit一词作保证金解释时是指“合同一方当事人向另一方当事人支付的用以保证合同履行的金钱，如其未能履行合同义务，则予以没收。它也可以 成为部分付款，从而使买受人成为合同标的物的真正所有权人”。 margin一词作保证金解释时是指“在证券交易中指客户存于经纪人处的一笔钱或等价物，以保证经纪人不因股票价格波动而遭受损失。也指客户在使用经纪人的贷款进行证券交易时必须缴纳的押金”。而practice qualifications并非法言法语。

    在参考香港法例的实践应用之后，特对保证金一词的译法做如下规范：在涉及有价证券买卖的情况下，使用margin一词，其他情况下应使用deposit一词。

    二、关于“转让”用词的规范

    在法规、规章和规范性文件的翻译中常常会遇到“转让”一词，目前无论是使用主动态还是被动态，大多采用“transfer”一词。在参考国外的法律文本和香港的法例后我们可以发现转让一词所对应的词包括： “assign”, “delegate”, “negotiate”, “transfer”四词。

    在法律语言中， “assign”作转让解释时是指转让财产，尤指转让属人财产或动产。在英格兰，是指属人动产、实产中的动产权益或实产中的衡平法权益的完全转让；在苏格兰是指将债权、股权等无形财产完全或仅作为担保加以转让的方式；“delegate”作转让解释时是指将（自己的债务人）转移给自己的债权人，而香港法例中采用了转授一词；“negotiate”作转让解释时是指转让流通票据（negotiable instruments）；“transfer”作转让解释时是指财产或所有权等的让与。

    为此，特对转让一词的译法做如下规范：当转让的是一种特定的权利或权益，尤其是财产权时，应使用assign一词；当转让的是流通票据时应采用negotiate一词；当转让的是一种权力或责任时，应采用delegate一词；而在其他不明确指或泛指状态时，则使用transfer一词。

   

    [专家论坛]

    编者按：本拦目专门刊登专家的翻译心得、体会和研究成果，旨在为法规、规章以及规范性文件翻译的研究提供一个相互交流、探讨的园地。

    本拦目刊载的文章仅代表作者的个人意见，并不代表本译审室的观点。

    本拦目热忱欢迎各位专家的来稿，稿酬从优。

    法律英语词语用法区别

        英语中原本没有所谓法律英语，但由于有关法律方面的英语有其特殊的用法和规律，慢慢地就像科技英语、商业英语等一样，自成一门学科。法律英语不同于“法言法语”(legal terms)，而是跨越英语与法律之间的边缘学科。许多地区，比如上海等地，还为此成立专门的培训机构。由于英汉语言习惯的不同，加上长期以来约定俗成的用法的影响，法律英语中常常出现一些容易混淆或错用的词语，在中英互译中常会发生一些有趣的语言现象。本文以比较轻松的漫谈方式，与读者作一些共同探讨，以引起广大读者对法律英语的兴趣。

    一、China, China's 和 Chinese作定语时大有区别

    这三个词都可以作定语用，译成“中国的”，但其含义却有很大区别。如China law firms是指“在中国的律师事务所”，未必是中国人开的，它应包括获准在中国设立的“外国律师事务所”(foreign law firms)。若指中国律师开的律师事务所，应用 Chinese law firms。在法律文书中，这很有讲究。在WTO法律文件中，如“中国经济的特性”(the special characteristic of China's economy)；“中国的关税配额制度”(China's TRO system)；“中国的具体承诺减让表”(China's Schedule of Specific Commitments)； “中国专利法”(China's Patent Law)等用语中，几乎都用China's而不用Chinese。但着重“中国人的”意义时，应该用 Chinese。如“中方”(Chinese side)；“中国人”(Chinese nationals)；“中国政府”(Chinese government)；“中国执业律师”(Chinese national registered lawyers)。

    当然，有些名词前面用China与Chinese都可以。如 Chinese lacquer(漆)；Chinese ink(墨)，但绝大多数都有固定搭配，应多查词典，不宜随便更动。如China Sea (中国海)；Chinatown(华人区、唐人街)；China teas(中国茶)；Chinese cabbage(白菜)；Chinese lantern(灯笼)等等均不可随便换用。

    二、同一个英语动词却有两个截然相反的词义

    同一个英语动词，在法律英语中，有时竟有两种几乎完全相反的含义，例如 discharge是法律英语中常见常用的一个词，它可作“履行”解，也可作“撤销”解，而这两个意思，在中文里几乎是完全相反的。因此翻译或运用它时必须特别当心。

    如discharge a contract指“履行合同”，不是“撤销合同”；discharge a bankrupt指“免除破产人的责任”，不是“履行破产人的责任”；discharge a burden of proof指“履行举证责任”，不是“撤销或免除举证责任”；discharge one's liabilities指“清偿某人的债务”，而不是“撤销某人的债务”；如说 The judge discharged the jury．这是说“法官解除了该陪审员的职务”，而不是“该法官履行了陪审员的职务”。

    三、怎样翻译“他已与妻子离婚了”?

     你可能将它译为He has divorced with his wife。如果这样，你就错了。因为作动词用时，divorce为“使离婚”，常用于被动语态，常用的搭配是to be divorced from somebody。因此本句应译成 He has been divorced from his wife。当然，它也可以用主动语态，译作 He has divorced his wife。此时，就不必加from了。切不可按汉语习惯加上with之类的介词。下面一些用法，粗看起来好像不大对头，实际上却都是非常地道的英语：

    Did Mr. Hill divorce his wife or did his wife divorce him? 是希尔先生要与妻子离婚还是他的妻子要与他离婚?

    The judge divorced them．法官让他们离婚了。(而不是法官与他们离婚)

    The court divorced Mr. and Mrs. Jones. 法庭给琼斯夫妇离了婚。

    四、谁是谁非：ouster, ejection, ejectment与eviction

    这几个词都可以译作“剥夺”、“驱逐”、“撵出”。但所用的场合完全不同，甚至相反。ouster是指合法占有人的权利被非法剥夺，因此香港人将它译作“横夺”，很有道理。而ejection和ejectment是对非法占有人所取得的非法权利的合理剥夺。

    例如，房产所有人将非法占有房产的人从该房产中驱逐出去，这种行为就称为 ejection 与ejectment。因此它是收回合法权利的行为，不可随便与ouster换用。

    如 For removal of illegal occupier from the property, she had to bring an action of ejectment.(为了把非法占有者从房产中驱逐出去，她只好提起收回不动产的诉讼。)中当然应用 ejectment。不过，有时很难说这一剥夺或驱逐行为是合法或不合法的。这时一般只能由说话人根据自己的立场来采用了。如 The police at the meeting were making an ejection to the trouble-makers.(在场警察在驱逐闹事者。)这就表示说话人认为闹事者是不对的。在诸如ouster of franchise(剥夺选举权)；ouster of jurisdiction(剥夺裁判权)中，暗示说话者认为该剥夺行为是不正当的；而在ejection of tenant(驱逐租户)；action of ejectment(收回不动产之诉)中，却暗示说话者认为这些剥夺行为是正当的。 但也有一个比较中性的词，那就是eviction, 它只指房地产主驱逐房客或承租人，收回房地产的行为，并不强调谁是谁非。如There have been a lot of evictions in this district recently.(本区近来已经发生多起驱逐房客的事件。)这表示说话人只想表明有这么一件事，没有表示这究竟是房东的错，还是房客的错。

    五、 mortgagor与mortgagee

     众所周知，作为名词的后缀，-or 指“施动者”，-ee指“受动者”。也许是施动者往往与权利人联系在一起(如employer, consignor, author), mortgagor常被误认为抵押权人。其实，在抵押关系中，正好相反，mortgagor是抵押人，又称出押人。他是抵押关系中的债务人。mortgagee才是抵押权人，又称受押人，他才是抵押关系中的债权人。这种误译或误解比较多，例如有―本商业英语词典在其foreclosure词条的原文例句中有这么一句例句： The mortgagor applied foreclosure when the mortgagee failed pay the installments of the loan.

    此书的中译者按原文译为“因受押人未能分期偿还贷款，抵押人申请取消抵押品的回赎权。”分期偿还贷款的应是抵押人，怎么变成受押人了? 有权申请取消抵押物回赎权的只能是债权人，即抵押权人，亦即译文所说的受押人。抵押人是债务人，他是无权申请取消回赎权的。显然，原文是把inortgagor与mortgagee两个词用反了。

    六、fraud squad与fraud gang

        一般词典把squad 与gang这两个词都译为小组、小队、一伙人，
但在法律词语中，两者的用法和含义有时完全不同。squad仅指一伙人(group of people)，并不包含贬义，如：Olympic squad是“参加奥林匹克的国家代表队”；fraud squad 是“调查欺诈案的公安小组”，而不是“欺诈小组”。the homicide squad是“杀人案件调查队”，而不是“杀人小组”。 gang这个词却常常含有贬义，一般指organized group of criminals(犯罪团伙)或group of people who are typically troublesome (一伙惹是生非的人)，如大家知道gang of four是指“四人帮”，而不是“四人小组”，fraud gang是“骗子团伙”。 gang-war是指歹徒帮派之间打群架，不是一般群众的打群架。因此如说Don't go around with that gang or you'll come no good! 表示说话人认为那伙人不是好人，与这些人混在一起自然没有好下场。

    七、domicile与 habitual residence

     这两个词语，在表面上没有什么区别。有的词典把这两个词都译成“住所”或“住处”。但在法律上，它们的含义完全不同。domicile是“住所地”。公民的住所地即户籍所在地。法人的住所地为法人的主要营业或办事机构所在地。所以有些比较仔细的词典将domicile译作“户籍”。而是指“经常居住地”，它不一定是一个人的户籍所在地。在法律文书中，对这两个词如果译得不准确，对案件的管辖权就会产生严重影响。如：我国民诉法第22条规定，对公民提起的民事诉讼，由被告住所地法院(the people’s court of the place where the defendant has his domicile)管辖。被告住所地不一致的，由经常居住地法院(the people's court of the place of his habitual residence)管辖。所谓habitual residence，法律也是有规定的。根据最高人民法院司法解释，公民的经常居住地是指公民离开住所地至起诉时已连续居住一年以上的地方。但公民住院就医的地方除外。

    八、bankrupt与insolvent

    在词典中，它们的中文对应词都是“破产的”、“无还债能力的”。 在法律词语中，它们的用法却有很大区别。或它的名词形式bankruptcy 既可用于公司、企业，也可以用于个人。如：Several local companies have gone bankrupt.(当地几家公司已经破产)；The court declared him bankrupt.(法庭宣告他破产)，都是正确的用法。

    而insolvent或它的名词形式insolvency在英国通常只能用于公司，不用于个人。如：Their company was in a state of insolvency.(他们的公司处于破产状态)。但在美语中，这种区别似乎已逐渐消失。比如，一个破产的人，可以用an insolvent person。当insolvent作名词用时，指的就是“破产的人”。

    九、“审判”的多变译法

    有人说，中文是最灵活的文字，一点不假。如“审判”一词，可以作动词、也可作名词、形容词。作名词时，既可表示一种职务，又可表示一种行为、动作甚至一种程序。如把“审判”译成英语，可没有这么方便。它常因内涵及场合的不同而必须有不同的译法。中英两种文字的这一差别，加上约定俗成的用法，就使“审判”出现许多不同的、有时甚至是不可互换的表达方式。这些各不相同的译法，少说也有十几种。下面用划线标出的都是“审判”一词的一些常见译法：

    审判由人民法院负责 The people's court are responsible for adjudication

    审判对象 object of adjudication

    国家审判机关 state adjudicatory organ

    审判权 judicial power

    审判人员 judicial personnel

    审判委员会 judicial committee

    审判程序 court proceedings; trial procedure

    审判组织 trial organization

    审判监督程序 procedure for trial supervision

    审判过程中 during a trial

    审判独立 independence of trial and decision

    缺席审判 judgment by default; trial by default

    审判案件 to try a case；trial of cases

    开庭审判 to open the court session for trial of the case

    公开审判 to be heard in public；open trial

    与刑事案件一并审判 to be heard together with the criminal case

    在审判／讯时参加旁听 to be present at the hearing

    审判不公 failure of justice

    审判地国 state of the forum

    审判费用 juridical expenses; litigation costs

    十、delivery order; delivery note 与delivery receipt 的区别

    这三个词组在字面上十分相似，但其法律含义几乎相反。delivery order 指货主或其授权代理人签发给货物持有人(比如仓库)指示货物持有入将货物交给指定的当事人的一种书面指示，因此一般译成“交货单”、“出货单”、“提货单”或者“栈单”，它是将货物提走的法律凭据。而delivery note与此正好相反，它是将货物送出并到达目的地后，由收货人签署过的送货通知，常用于通常的交接货上，一般译为“交货回单”或“送货回执”。在中文的法律文书中，常有把“交货单”与“交货通知”或“交货回单”等随便混用的，这在英译本中是绝对不允许的，有时一字之差，就会引起严重的法律后果，不可不慎。

    十一、切忌望文生义

      法律英语中有许多词语是在几百年甚至上千年的历史过程中逐步形成的，形式与含义都比较固定。有许多词语，貌似相同，实有区别。这种内在的区别，完全来自历史上的约定俗成，光从字面上是无法找到原因的。因此翻译时，如无充分把握，必须多查词典，切忌望文生义，随便翻译。如ground lease与ground rent 两个词语，尽管lease与rent都可以译成“租赁”、“租借”，但ground lease 在英国专指 the first lease on a freehold building (对完全保有的房地产的首次出租)，而ground rent 即通常所说的“地租”。 又如hard money; hard currency; hard cash 看上去像同义词。事实上不然。 hard money 在美语中指相对于纸币而言的“硬币”，有时也作“现金”解。hard currency 可不是硬币，也不一定是现金。它是指价值比较稳定的“硬通货”。如美元、欧元、英镑等都是目前世界上的hard currency，但它们不一定是'hard money。至于hard cash (or hardcash)，只指“现金”，非正式用法中，有时也指“硬币”，但决非指“硬通货”。又如 Day of Judgment 或 Judgment Day 并非指通常所说的“宣判日”，而是指“世界末日”。所以也有写成Day of the Last Judgment 的。它与法院定期宣判的日子毫不相干。“宣判日”该用date of the pronouncement of judgment 或 the date to pronounce a judgment 才是。

    十二、相同的中文对应词，含义未必相同

    法律英语中，光凭中文对应词来翻译，是非常危险的。因为有许多法律词语虽然中文对应词相同，含义却不同，有时相去甚远。例如：free trade area与free trade zone的中文对应词都是“自由贸易区”，但习惯上，free trade area 指实行自由贸易的一批国家。它们是为了通过降低或取消关税以消除成员国之间的贸易障碍而组成的部分国家联盟。而free trade zone 却指一个国家内免征关税的贸易区域，范围显然要小得多。

    legacy与 devise 的中文对应词都是“遗赠”。但legacy 一般只指动产的遗赠，不包括不动产。devise 则专指不动产的遗赠。

    majority 与 plurality 的中文对应词都是“多数” 然而majority 指超过半数的多数。plurality 指的是没有超过半数的多数，或称相对多数(relative majority)。比如说He won the election by a clear majority, gaining 70 of the l00 votes cast．(他以明显的多数赢得选举，在所投的100张票中得了70票)。这个句子中的majority 就决不可换成 plurality。同样的道理，“压倒多数”，只能译为overwhelming majority，而不可译为overwhelming plurality。因为连半数都没有超过，就算不了“压倒”。

    deportation order与 exclusion order在法律词典中都被译作“驱逐令”。其实两者含义迥异。前者指将某人驱逐出国的正式命令。而exclusion order却指婚姻诉讼中用以阻止丈夫或妻子进入婚姻住所的法庭命令(court order in matrimonial proceedings which stops a wife or husband from going into matrimonial home)。

    又如 murder; manslaughter；homicide 这三个字，通常都可译作“杀人”，其实它们有很大区别。murder指“故意杀人”，即“谋杀”。它专指“有预谋的蓄意谋杀”(premeditated and deliberate murder)，在美国称为 first degree murder(一级谋杀)。manslaughter 指“过失杀人”或“误杀”，着重于没有预谋的杀人。所以，非自愿的杀人，被称为 involuntary manslaughter。甚至，即使是有意的杀人行为：，但显然具有从轻情节的，比如遇到对方挑衅、出于职务上的原因、或者出于正当防卫的杀人，也称 voluntary manslaughter，而不用murder这个词。homicide 则泛指所有的杀人，既包括意外的过失杀人，也包括故意杀人。如 The homicide rate has doubled in the last ten years.(在过去十年里，杀人犯罪率增加了一倍。)这显然指各种各样的杀人案件。如culpable homicide (刑事杀人)，justifiable homicide (正当杀人)等都包括在内。

    In capital 与 in words 都被译成“大写”。可是in capital 是指英文字母的大写，通常尤指英文单词的第一个字母的大写。如北京应写成 Beijing。而 in words 却指数字的大写，如 518 写成 five hundred and eighteen。因此total number of containers (in words)是指“集装箱总数须用大写”，不能用一般阿拉伯数目字表示。He signed a cheque for $10,000 in words.(他用大写签发了一张一万美元的支票。)指的是用大写写成一万美元(ten thousand dollars)，而不是指支票上的姓名大写。由此可见，一本好的英汉法律词典决不应以只向读者提供中文对应词为满足。

    十三、切忌逐字翻译

     法律英语中，有许多词语是长期以来形成的固定用语，有其固定的含义。如果将它拆开来逐字翻译，即使每个字都译得对，也非出错不可。如power of attorney 原意为“授权委托书”，有的人根据词典逐字翻译为“检察官的权力”。to file a brief 不是“将案情摘要归档”，而是指律师“向法院提出辩护” He has plenty of briefs．不是说他有许多摘要，而是说他的律师生意很忙。类似这些例子说明，在英译中时，虽然每个词都译对了，有时却与原意相去甚远。反之，在中译英方面，也不宜对照词典逐字翻译。如foreign一词，虽然在诸如foreign policy(外交政策)；foreign affairs(涉外事务)；foreign trade(对外贸易)等词语中都有“涉外”的意思，但把“涉外律师事务所”译成foreign law firms 或者 foreign lawyer office 就显然不妥。按照WTO法律文件的标准译法，在中国设立的外国律师事务所才称为foreign law firms。而国内的涉外律师事务所应译为 foreign affairs lawyer office 或者 foreign-related law firms。同样的道理，foreign enterprises 是“外国企业”，而非涉外企业；foreign securities institutions 是“外国证券机构”，而非涉外证券机构；foreign award of arbitration 是“外国仲裁裁决”而非涉外仲裁裁决。

    十四、当心多义词的翻译

        记得美国总统克林顿因为与白宫实习生莫尼卡发生绯闻事件而受到法律起诉时，报纸上常常出现某某联邦律师出庭指控或传讯总统之类的报道。当时很多人都感到纳闷，美国律师怎么有权出庭指控或传讯一位被认为犯了法的现任总统呢? 这位律师又是受了谁的委托? 难道是美国法律特殊? 后来才弄明白，原来是新闻稿中把attorney一词译错了。attorney 在美语中常指律师、代理人。如attorney at law 专指律师，attorney of record 指记录在案的律师，attorney of the day 指值班律师。也许正由于这一原因，attorney 的另一个重要的意义“检察官”反而被忽视了。原来指控和传讯克林顿的不是什么律师，而是联邦检察官。美国的法律并不例外。在法律英语中这种一词多义或者貌似相同的词语非常多。它们在不同的场合具有不同的含义，译成中文时，必须十分小心。如 executioner 和 executor 都是从 execute 或 execution(执行)这个词转化过来的，但executor 是指“执行员”，而executioner 指的是行刑的“刽子手”。detention house 是“拘留所”，而detention home是“少年感化院”或“少年管教所”。tally man 是“赊销商店店主”，而 tally clerk 是远洋货运中的“理货员”。wrong intervention 是指“不正确的干涉”，着重于not morally right (不道德的)，而wrongful intervention 指的是“不合法的干涉”，着重于not fair/legal (不公平、不合法的)。后者远比前者严重。尽管evasion, dodge, avoidance, shield, shelter 等词都作“回避”、“规避”等解释，大同小异，但 tax evasion 与 tax dodge (or tax dodging)都指“偷税”或“漏税”，即“非法逃税”。这是犯罪行为，要负刑事责任。而 tax avoidance; tax shelter与tax shield 均指“避税”、“省税”。是指在合法范围内以合法的手段避开可能交纳的税，属于合法行为。如Accountants advise on tax avoidance. (会计师就如何避税提出建议)；She was jailed for tax evasion.(她因逃税而入狱。)The system in Netherlands provides a useful tax shelter for some UK companies. (荷兰的税收制度为一些英国公司提供了有效的避税方法。)法律文书中类似这些细微的差别都必须区分清楚，才能保证译文的正确。

    （摘自：法律英语学习 http://51trans.fyfz.cn/blog/51trans/index.aspx?blogid=24598）

   

    [国外法律]

    编者按：本栏目主要刊载国外法律、法规，以为大家提供一个学习和研究各类法律文件的园地。

    鉴于目前闭路电视监视系统（CCTV system）在国内的普及与公民合法权利和权益保护的冲突日益显现，本期特刊载英国与CCTV system管理有关的“Data Protection Act 1998”（节选）以飨读者。

    Data Protection Act 1998

    Part II  Rights of data subjects and others

    7 Right of access to personal data

    (1) Subject to the following provisions of this section and to sections 8 and 9, an individual is entitled―

    (a) to be informed by any data controller whether personal data of which that individual is the data subject are being processed by or on behalf of that data controller,

    (b) if that is the case, to be given by the data controller a description of―

    (i) the personal data of which that individual is the data subject,

    (ii) the purposes for which they are being or are to be processed, and

    (iii) the recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed,

    (c) to have communicated to him in an intelligible form―

    (i) the information constituting any personal data of which that individual is the data subject, and

    (ii) any information available to the data controller as to the source of those data, and

    (d) where the processing by automatic means of personal data of which that individual is the data subject for the purpose of evaluating matters relating to him such as, for example, his performance at work, his creditworthiness, his reliability or his conduct, has constituted or is likely to constitute the sole basis for any decision significantly affecting him, to be informed by the data controller of the logic involved in that decision-taking.

    (2) A data controller is not obliged to supply any information under subsection (1) unless he has received―

    (a) a request in writing, and

    (b) except in prescribed cases, such fee (not exceeding the prescribed maximum) as he may require.

    (3) A data controller is not obliged to comply with a request under this section unless he is supplied with such information as he may reasonably require in order to satisfy himself as to the identity of the person making the request and to locate the information which that person seeks.

    (4) Where a data controller cannot comply with the request without disclosing information relating to another individual who can be identified from that information, he is not obliged to comply with the request unless―

    (a) the other individual has consented to the disclosure of the information to the person making the request, or

    (b) it is reasonable in all the circumstances to comply with the request without the consent of the other individual.

    (5) In subsection (4) the reference to information relating to another individual includes a reference to information identifying that individual as the source of the information sought by the request; and that subsection is not to be construed as excusing a data controller from communicating so much of the information sought by the request as can be communicated without disclosing the identity of the other individual concerned, whether by the omission of names or other identifying particulars or otherwise.

    (6) In determining for the purposes of subsection (4)(b) whether it is reasonable in all the circumstances to comply with the request without the consent of the other individual concerned, regard shall be had, in particular, to―

    (a) any duty of confidentiality owed to the other individual,

    (b) any steps taken by the data controller with a view to seeking the consent of the other individual,

    (c) whether the other individual is capable of giving consent, and

    (d) any express refusal of consent by the other individual.

    (7) An individual making a request under this section may, in such cases as may be prescribed, specify that his request is limited to personal data of any prescribed description.

    (8) Subject to subsection (4), a data controller shall comply with a request under this section promptly and in any event before the end of the prescribed period beginning with the relevant day.

    (9) If a court is satisfied on the application of any person who has made a request under the foregoing provisions of this section that the data controller in question has failed to comply with the request in contravention of those provisions, the court may order him to comply with the request.

    (10) In this section―

・        “prescribed” means prescribed by the Secretary of State by regulations;

・        “the prescribed maximum” means such amount as may be prescribed;

・        “the prescribed period” means forty days or such other period as may be prescribed;

・        “the relevant day”, in relation to a request under this section, means the day on which the data controller receives the request or, if later, the first day on which the data controller has both the required fee and the information referred to in subsection (3).

    (11) Different amounts or periods may be prescribed under this section in relation to different cases.

    8 Provisions supplementary to section 7

    (1) The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that, in such cases as may be prescribed, a request for information under any provision of subsection (1) of section 7 is to be treated as extending also to information under other provisions of that subsection.

    (2) The obligation imposed by section 7(1)(c)(i) must be complied with by supplying the data subject with a copy of the information in permanent form unless―

    (a) the supply of such a copy is not possible or would involve disproportionate effort, or

    (b) the data subject agrees otherwise; and

    where any of the information referred to in section 7(1)(c)(i) is expressed in terms which are not intelligible without explanation the copy must be accompanied by an explanation of those terms.

    (3) Where a data controller has previously complied with a request made under section 7 by an individual, the data controller is not obliged to comply with a subsequent identical or similar request under that section by that individual unless a reasonable interval has elapsed between compliance with the previous request and the making of the current request.

    (4) In determining for the purposes of subsection (3) whether requests under section 7 are made at reasonable intervals, regard shall be had to the nature of the data, the purpose for which the data are processed and the frequency with which the data are altered.

    (5) Section 7(1)(d) is not to be regarded as requiring the provision of information as to the logic involved in any decision-taking if, and to the extent that, the information constitutes a trade secret.

    (6) The information to be supplied pursuant to a request under section 7 must be supplied by reference to the data in question at the time when the request is received, except that it may take account of any amendment or deletion made between that time and the time when the information is supplied, being an amendment or deletion that would have been made regardless of the receipt of the request.

    (7) For the purposes of section 7(4) and (5) another individual can be identified from the information being disclosed if he can be identified from that information, or from that and any other information which, in the reasonable belief of the data controller, is likely to be in, or to come into, the possession of the data subject making the request.

    9 Application of section 7 where data controller is credit reference agency

    (1) Where the data controller is a credit reference agency, section 7 has effect subject to the provisions of this section.

    (2) An individual making a request under section 7 may limit his request to personal data relevant to his financial standing, and shall be taken to have so limited his request unless the request shows a contrary intention.

    (3) Where the data controller receives a request under section 7 in a case where personal data of which the individual making the request is the data subject are being processed by or on behalf of the data controller, the obligation to supply information under that section includes an obligation to give the individual making the request a statement, in such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State by regulations, of the individual’s rights―

    (a) under section 159 of the [1974 c. 39.] Consumer Credit Act 1974 , and

    (b) to the extent required by the prescribed form, under this Act.

    10 Right to prevent processing likely to cause damage or distress

    (1) Subject to subsection (2), an individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data controller to require the data controller at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing, or processing for a specified purpose or in a specified manner, any personal data in respect of which he is the data subject, on the ground that, for specified reasons―

    (a) the processing of those data or their processing for that purpose or in that manner is causing or is likely to cause substantial damage or substantial distress to him or to another, and

    (b) that damage or distress is or would be unwarranted.

    (2) Subsection (1) does not apply―

    (a) in a case where any of the conditions in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Schedule 2 is met, or

    (b) in such other cases as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State by order.

    (3) The data controller must within twenty-one days of receiving a notice under subsection (1) (“the data subject notice”) give the individual who gave it a written notice―

    (a) stating that he has complied or intends to comply with the data subject notice, or

    (b) stating his reasons for regarding the data subject notice as to any extent unjustified and the extent (if any) to which he has complied or intends to comply with it.

    (4) If a court is satisfied, on the application of any person who has given a notice under subsection (1) which appears to the court to be justified (or to be justified to any extent), that the data controller in question has failed to comply with the notice, the court may order him to take such steps for complying with the notice (or for complying with it to that extent) as the court thinks fit.

    (5) The failure by a data subject to exercise the right conferred by subsection (1) or section 11(1) does not affect any other right conferred on him by this Part.

    11 Right to prevent processing for purposes of direct marketing

    (1) An individual is entitled at any time by notice in writing to a data controller to require the data controller at the end of such period as is reasonable in the circumstances to cease, or not to begin, processing for the purposes of direct marketing personal data in respect of which he is the data subject.

    (2) If the court is satisfied, on the application of any person who has given a notice under subsection (1), that the data controller has failed to comply with the notice, the court may order him to take such steps for complying with the notice as the court thinks fit.

    (3) In this section “direct marketing” means the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising or marketing material which is directed to particular individuals.

    12 Rights in relation to automated decision-taking

    (1) An individual is entitled at any time, by notice in writing to any data controller, to require the data controller to ensure that no decision taken by or on behalf of the data controller which significantly affects that individual is based solely on the processing by automatic means of personal data in respect of which that individual is the data subject for the purpose of evaluating matters relating to him such as, for example, his performance at work, his creditworthiness, his reliability or his conduct.

    (2) Where, in a case where no notice under subsection (1) has effect, a decision which significantly affects an individual is based solely on such processing as is mentioned in subsection (1)―

    (a) the data controller must as soon as reasonably practicable notify the individual that the decision was taken on that basis, and

    (b) the individual is entitled, within twenty-one days of receiving that notification from the data controller, by notice in writing to require the data controller to reconsider the decision or to take a new decision otherwise than on that basis.

    (3) The data controller must, within twenty-one days of receiving a notice under subsection (2)(b) (“the data subject notice”) give the individual a written notice specifying the steps that he intends to take to comply with the data subject notice.

    (4) A notice under subsection (1) does not have effect in relation to an exempt decision; and nothing in subsection (2) applies to an exempt decision.

    (5) In subsection (4) “exempt decision” means any decision―

    (a) in respect of which the condition in subsection (6) and the condition in subsection (7) are met, or

    (b) which is made in such other circumstances as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State by order.

    (6) The condition in this subsection is that the decision―

    (a) is taken in the course of steps taken―

    (i) for the purpose of considering whether to enter into a contract with the data subject,

    (ii) with a view to entering into such a contract, or

    (iii) in the course of performing such a contract, or

    (b) is authorised or required by or under any enactment.

    (7) The condition in this subsection is that either―

    (a) the effect of the decision is to grant a request of the data subject, or

    (b) steps have been taken to safeguard the legitimate interests of the data subject (for example, by allowing him to make representations).

    (8) If a court is satisfied on the application of a data subject that a person taking a decision in respect of him (“the responsible person”) has failed to comply with subsection (1) or (2)(b), the court may order the responsible person to reconsider the decision, or to take a new decision which is not based solely on such processing as is mentioned in subsection (1).

    (9) An order under subsection (8) shall not affect the rights of any person other than the data subject and the responsible person.

    13 Compensation for failure to comply with certain requirements

    (1) An individual who suffers damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that damage.

    (2) An individual who suffers distress by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act is entitled to compensation from the data controller for that distress if―

    (a) the individual also suffers damage by reason of the contravention, or

    (b) the contravention relates to the processing of personal data for the special purposes.

    (3) In proceedings brought against a person by virtue of this section it is a defence to prove that he had taken such care as in all the circumstances was reasonably required to comply with the requirement concerned.

    14 Rectification, blocking, erasure and destruction

    (1) If a court is satisfied on the application of a data subject that personal data of which the applicant is the subject are inaccurate, the court may order the data controller to rectify, block, erase or destroy those data and any other personal data in respect of which he is the data controller and which contain an expression of opinion which appears to the court to be based on the inaccurate data.

    (2) Subsection (1) applies whether or not the data accurately record information received or obtained by the data controller from the data subject or a third party but where the data accurately record such information, then―

    (a) if the requirements mentioned in paragraph 7 of Part II of Schedule 1 have been complied with, the court may, instead of making an order under subsection (1), make an order requiring the data to be supplemented by such statement of the true facts relating to the matters dealt with by the data as the court may approve, and

    (b) if all or any of those requirements have not been complied with, the court may, instead of making an order under that subsection, make such order as it thinks fit for securing compliance with those requirements with or without a further order requiring the data to be supplemented by such a statement as is mentioned in paragraph (a).

    (3) Where the court―

    (a) makes an order under subsection (1), or

    (b) is satisfied on the application of a data subject that personal data of which he was the data subject and which have been rectified, blocked, erased or destroyed were inaccurate, it may, where it considers it reasonably practicable, order the data controller to notify third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of the rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction.

    (4) If a court is satisfied on the application of a data subject―

    (a) that he has suffered damage by reason of any contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of this Act in respect of any personal data, in circumstances entitling him to compensation under section 13, and

    (b) that there is a substantial risk of further contravention in respect of those data in such circumstances, the court may order the rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction of any of those data.

    (5) Where the court makes an order under subsection (4) it may, where it considers it reasonably practicable, order the data controller to notify third parties to whom the data have been disclosed of the rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction.

    (6) In determining whether it is reasonably practicable to require such notification as is mentioned in subsection (3) or (5) the court shall have regard, in particular, to the number of persons who would have to be notified.

    15 Jurisdiction and procedure

    (1) The jurisdiction conferred by sections 7 to 14 is exercisable by the High Court or a county court or, in Scotland, by the Court of Session or the sheriff.

    (2) For the purpose of determining any question whether an applicant under subsection (9) of section 7 is entitled to the information which he seeks (including any question whether any relevant data are exempt from that section by virtue of Part IV) a court may require the information constituting any data processed by or on behalf of the data controller and any information as to the logic involved in any decision-taking as mentioned in section 7(1)(d) to be made available for its own inspection but shall not, pending the determination of that question in the applicant’s favor, require the information sought by the applicant to be disclosed to him or his representatives whether by discovery (or, in Scotland, recovery) or otherwise.